It is desired that in order to cooperate with the French aeronautics, the American Government should adopt the following program: the formation of a flying corps of 4,500 airplanes -personnel and material included -to be sent to the French front during the campaign in 1918. The total number of pilots, including reserve, should be 5,000 and 53,000 mechanicians. 2,000 planes should be constructed each month as well as 4,000 engines by the American factories. That is to say, that during the first six months of 1918, 16,5000 planes (of the last type) and 30,000 engines will have to be built. The French Government is anxious to know if the American Government accepts this proposition, which would allow the Allies to win supremacy of the air., (signed) "Ribot" Know simply as the "Ribot Cable," this proposal was approved by the War Department on 27 May and was to become the basis for the army aviation expansion effort.
The enormity of this undertaking seems to have been lost on U.S. policymakers. The Ribot cable in effect, was asking America to produce more in one year than France had done in three years of war.
3 Moreover, this expectation was prefaced on an industrial infrastructure that lagged far behind those of the European powers. Young Henry H.
Arnold, then a major, certainly realized just how enormous the task facing the U.S. was when he wrote:
We were told to prepare a bill for Congress. Our understaffed Airplane Division in the War Department received the news with great interest. It was our first program....At this time we ranked fourteenth among the nations of the world in aviation. Actually it was worst than that. Statistics aside, we had no airpower at all. In the raw, the country's manpower, industrial strength, and the national know-how in general assured the building of any kind of military force we wanted-if there was a realistic organization of energy and material, and if there was time. Was there time? 4 Although the concerns of Major Arnold and many others were focused primarily on industrial mobilization and the production of aircraft, it was also apparent that training and production of aviators would present a tremendous challenge.
Any doubts about America's ability to meet these challenges were rapidly overshadowed by both public and political enthusiasm. In order to gain support for the unprecedented appropriations that such a program required, many in Congress and the military made some seemingly rash predictions about the ability to meet the goals set forth in the Ribot cable. Even though Congress appropriated over $600 million for the effort, it was soon obvious that America would not be able to live up to the original agreement.
Within months a revised air program was presented to the allies.
The failure to meet the original air program was due primarily to the lack of experience on the part of American industry. This lack of experience was further exacerbated by the reluctance of the Allies to share their knowledge of aviation technology. "Probably no military secrets were more closely guarded in Europe than developments in aircraft." 5 While the same lack of experience also caused the original estimates for the training program to be readjusted, the French, British and to some extent
Italians were much more willing to share their expertise in training with the Army Air
Service. The Air Service was able to take advantage of these well established programs to create a program that encompassed the best training methods of the day. The knowledge and experience gained from these developmental efforts and the early years of the world's first "air war" resulted in an aviation training program which was second to none and produced many of the finest aviators of the time.
The French training program in World War I, sometimes referred to as the "Bleriot" system was based on the concept of self-reliance. After about two months of ground training in the theory of flight the student progressed to the flying stage. From the first day of flying until the student received his wings he was alone in the cockpit. The curriculum relied on the individual to "teach" himself to fly through a carefully planned step-by-step process.
The first stage, known as the Penguin, was not really flying at all. After a brief lesson on the use of the rudder bar, the student was placed in an under-powered Bleriot, whose clipped wings allowed the student to raise the tail but made it virtually impossible to leave the ground. The student would then run the Penguin up and down the field at about 40 mp.h. attempting to maintain a relatively straight path. After a series of successful runs, usually around six, the student graduated to the roleur.
The focus of roleur class also focused on maintaining what the French termed "line de vole" or line of flight. In this class though, the Bleriot's wings were not clipped and the airplane was capable of limited flight. This stage was supposed to teach the student how to keep the airplane on the ground when it wanted to fly. Again, after a series of successful runs the student was graduated to the next phase of training.
In the decolle class the student pilot was allowed to "fly" the airplane down the field in series of short hops, a couple of meters in height. In this stage the student was not taught to land the plane, per se, but to simply pull back the power and let the plane settle back to the ground. The first attempts at landings came in the pique class which followed immediately after the decolle.
The pique class was the student's first chance to "...point the machine toward the ground..." and was made up of two stages. 3 In the first stage the student executed the decolle to height of approximately 20 feet and then pointed the aircraft down to land.
Next came the advanced pique which consisted of a climb to 300 feet, flying a box around the field using flat, rudder-only turns and finished with a power-off landing. 4 This power landings were required during this stage because, as the student was told, "...engines...did not always function as one wished." 5 At the discretion of the instructor the student was passed to next phase and began learning basic combat maneuvers.
Maneuvers taught to the students at this stage of training progressed gradually from simple maneuvers such as banked turns to figure-eights and spirals. As the student became more proficient at these maneuvers he moved on to better and faster airplanes, climbing to greater altitudes, making short trips and perfecting his basic skills. To leave this stage the student pilot had to climb to an altitude of two thousand feet, turn his motor off, spiral down to the ground, and land within a few yards of a fixed point on the ground. 6 With this successfully completed the student moved on to the last phase of training prior to receiving his brevet or pilot wings.
In the voyages phase the student pilot was required to pass both a cross-country test and an altitude test. The first consisted of a flight in which the student demonstrated that he could successfully navigate between three points located 60 miles apart. In the second test the student pilot was required to spend at least one hour above 2000 meters (about 7,000 feet). This was to ensure a familiarity with the conditions at high altitudes. With these two tests completed the student officially became a pilote-aviateur and was allowed to wear the coveted gold wings.
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The final step for the French pursuit pilot before going to the front was the ecoles de perfectionment-the fighter school at Pau. At Pau the same philosophy prevailed as in the basic training program. Self-reliance was key and as in the basic schools the pilots were alone in the cockpit from the first day of training. This is where the pilot perfected the skills necessary to survive at the front. In addition to advanced combat maneuvers such as the spin, renversements, vertical banks, and wing slip the future pursuit pilot also learned gunnery skills and how to fly and fight in formations. As the pilot's skills in these maneuvers improved he moved on to progressively more capable and powerful aircraft in preparation for those he would encounter at the front. The British method of instruction differed greatly from the "Bleriot system" used by the French. The French used a highly structured, step-by-step process which allowed the student to "teach" himself to fly through trial and error. The British relied on a dual- The potential aviator's first experiences with the RFC were less than promising. All officers were temporarily stripped of rank and became cadets for a six month probationary period or until they completed the training program. 7 The cadet then spent as long as six weeks in "depot" waiting for a vacancy in the training program. When the student pilot mastered all of these basic maneuvers, he went through a series of solo flights. This was really the culmination of the Smith-Barry program, the purpose of which, according to Smith Barry was "...not...to prevent fliers from getting into difficulties or dangers but to show them how to get out of them satisfactorily and having done so, to go and make them repeat the process alone." 15 Prior to each solo flight the instructor specified the series of maneuvers to be performed and following the flight each maneuver was analyzed by the instructor and student. This period of solo flying was followed by more dual-control flight to perfect the maneuvers the student had practiced solo.
Following the award of his certification as a member of the RFC (and more importantly his wings), the British pursuit pilot followed much the same path as his French Having no precedent of its own to guide the development of such a training program, the decision was made early on to adopt the methods currently being used by the Allies.
To expedite the development of a stateside program the Canadian program (which was the RFC training program) was copied in near totality. It included ground school (from eight to ten weeks), preliminary flight training (three to four months), advanced flight training (two to three months), and specialized flight training such as aerial gunnery, bombing, or observation schools (from two to four weeks). During his eight weeks to twelve weeks of training, the cadet was subjected to a rigorous program which included basic instruction on: the principles and theory of flight, radio, codes, and photography; the operation and maintenance of aircraft engines and machine guns, the care of the airframe itself; and in meteorology and astronomy.
10 Considerable time was also devoted to learning discipline, military law and some idea of officer behavior.
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Upon completion of the ground school phase, the next step in the program was supposed to be preliminary flight training. By the early summer of 1917, it was obvious that the construction of flight training bases in the U.S. was not keeping pace with the output of cadets from the ground schools. In an effort to obviate this surplus until sufficient training fields could be constructed, many of the early ground school graduates were sent to Canada to receive their preliminary flight instruction.
Additionally, the United States was asked to send 100 cadets a month to France for preliminary training beginning in July of 1917. Because many of these cadets did not reach France until the late fall of 1917 the training positions they were promised were no longer available. 12 Numbering over 1,000, most these cadets were the "honor graduates"
of their respective ground school classes and had been sent to Europe as a reward for their performance. Although all of the cadets eventually received flight training, many months were spent in limbo waiting for the chance to climb into a cockpit. Fortunately, this was not the typical path of progression for the cadets who remained in the U.S. 14 The RMA test was a flight evaluation administered by a "check" pilot and typically consisted of the following events:
1. Climb out of a field 2,000 square feet and attain 500 feet altitude, keeping all parts of the machine inside the square during the climb. 2. Glides at normal angle, with motor throttled. Spirals to right and left. Change of direction in gliding. 3. At 1,000 feet cut off motor and land within 200 feet of a previously designated point. 4. Land over an assumed obstacle 10 feet high and come to rest within 1,500 feet of the same. 5. Cross-country triangular flight of 30 miles, passing over two previously designated points. Minimum altitude 2,500 feet. 6. Straight-away cross-country flight of 30 miles. Landing to be made at a designated destination. Both outward and return flights at a minimum of 2,500 feet. 7. Fly for 45 minutes at an altitude of 4,000 feet.
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Upon completion of the RMA, the cadet received his RMA wings and was commissioned a lieutenant.
Following preliminary training, the vast majority of American pilots proceeded overseas for their advanced training and gunnery training. Although advanced flying schools were being established in the U.S., it was apparent that they would not produce qualified pilots quickly enough to meet the demands of the Allies and the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.). The advanced training program in the U.S. was slow to develop due lack of qualified, combat-seasoned instructors, advanced aircraft of the type being flown at the front, and the insufficiency of U.S. training doctrine and standards. The site decided upon for this advanced aviation school was Issodun, France.
Issodun, located about 100 miles southeast of Paris, was primarily chosen because the surrounding countryside was extremely level and relatively sparsely populated with wideopen spaces for flying fields. 2 The site was also relatively close to a major governmentowned railroad line. Probably just as important was its proximity to the aviation factories and new plane assembly fields in the south which were to supply the aircraft to be used in the training at Issodun. Inspite of the advantages of this location, significant work was required to bring the Third Aviation Instruction Center (3 rd AIC), as it was to be named, to life. By early fall ofthat same year construction at the field was in full-swing. While the initial pace of building was hectic in an effort to make the base operational as quickly as possible, construction at Issodun was never really completed and continued right up to the
Armistice. An early arrival at Issodun in the fall of 1917 wrote:
There are acres of ground just Uttered with great piles of lumber, and supplies of every description. Our own branch railway bringing carloads of everything. Many buildings of all kinds are already up and going: others in the process of speedy construction. Haifa mile away you can see row after row of great canvas hangars....Everywhere is hustle, activity, (and loads of mud). 
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As a result of this furious pace of construction, Issodun was fully operational and training was being conducted within a months of Pershing accepting the base.
The 3 rd AIC at Issodun was initially to be merely a "refresher course" for American pursuit pilots arriving in France, prior to being sent to the front. The intent was for the American pilots, having already received advance training in the United States, to become acquainted with the current tactics and aircraft being used at the front. As described earlier, the advanced aviation schools in the U.S. were slow to develop and lacked both aircraft of the type being used at the front and pilots with combat experience to act as instructors. This lack of advance training in the U.S. dictated the development of a complete course in advanced flying and aerial tactics at Issodun. After having demonstrated the ability to correctly apply the rudder on the ground, the student moved on to Field 2, for training in the dual-control Nieuport 23 (so named for its 23 square meter wing surface-significantly less than that of JN-4). 8 The use of dualcontrol aircraft at Field 2 was the one major departure from the Bleriot system and came Before the student could progress to Field 3 for solo training, he had to demonstrate proficiency not only to his instructor, but also to another pilot designated as a "tester."
This evaluation consisted of the student demonstrating, ...that he could take his Nieuport off in the desired direction without having it turn away from the wind, that he knew how to climb on his first turn, throttle his motor down so as to secure maximum efficiency in level flight, make his turns without losing any elevation, avoid 'skidding' (caused by too much rudder and too little bank), avoid 'slipping' (caused by too little rudder and too much bank), make 'three-point landings' with the wheels and tail skid hitting at the same moment, and, by proper use of the rudder, overcome the tendency of the Nieuport to 'cheval'...
Once this evaluation was successfully completed, the student moved to Field 3.
The Nieuport 23 was also flown at Field 3, but was configured at this field for solo flight. The emphasis of the training at Field 3 was on the student building self-confidence in his mastery of the eccentricities of the rotary engine and the more maneuverable During the final stage of training at Field 3 the student received about an hour of acrobatic training with an instructor. The purpose of this introductory training in acrobatics was to expose the student to the kinds of forces he would begin to experience at Field 9 and to determine whether or not he was suited to the demands of such flying.
For those who wanted to continue on as pursuit pilots, Field 9 was the critical phase of training. The single-seat Nieuport 18(18 square meter wing surface) was flown a Field 9. It was a smaller, faster, more maneuverable and more difficult airplane to master. In 1915 and 1916 the Nieuport 18 was used extensively at the front. 11 The pilots who were not able to master the 18, were diverted out of the pursuit program and were sent to the bomber or reconnaissance training programs.
The training at Field 9 was broken into three phases. The first consisted of a landing class in which the student made anywhere from ten to thirty landings to familiarize himself with the faster landings speeds of the 18. This was followed by a spiral class in which the student practiced different kinds of turns including the "tight spiral" with turns using up to 90-degree bank angles. The third phase was made up of air work which introduced the student to basic combat maneuvers. All of this training was completed with the instructor observing from the ground and verbally correcting mistakes when the student landed.
Those who successfully completed the work at Field 9 moved on to Fields 4,5, and 6.
The Nieuport 15 was flown at Fields 4,5, and 6. This was a smaller aircraft, with handling characteristics very similar to those being flown at the front. This stage of training emphasized the more advanced acrobatic maneuvers including the split-S, the spin and wing slips. The training during this phase also acted as a further filter to weed out those who might not be suited to pursuit aviation at the front. Those who successfully completed the training at these three fields went on to Field 7.
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The Nieuport 15 was also used during this phase but was equipped with a much larger engine. Initially, the training at Field 7 was a continuation of the previous phases, with the primary emphasis being acclimation to the more powerful motor. In addition to learning the characteristics of the larger motor, the student began to learn how to fly in formation and the tactics of offensive and defensive patrols. In keeping with the French philosophy of training, the student was first introduced to the most basic formations and tactics and then gradually made familiar with the latest aerial tactics as they were being practiced at the front. 12 Having mastered the basics of patrol and formation flying, the pilot moved on to Field 8, the final stage of training at Issodun.
At Field 8 the student was taught some basic aerial gunnery skills. This was accomplished by having the pilot climb to a specified altitude to release a small parachute.
He would then follow parachute down, trying at all times to keep his gun sights on it.
After some practice with the parachute, the students engaged in mock-dogfights with the instructors. These dogfights were conducted one-on-one and in patrol formations. This was a chance for the students to all they had learned prior to going to the front. All aerial combat was conducted using camera-guns. This allowed both the instructor and student to evaluate the training and to get a feel for what might have happened in actual combat.
Upon completion of the training at Field 8 most pilots attended the aerial gunnery schools at Cazaux or at St. Jean-de-Monts prior to joining the forces at the front.
When the first students of the school at Issodun reported for duty to the front the were among the most extensively trained pilots of the day. 
Conclusion
In the 80 years following World War I America's pilot training program has remained, at a very fundamental level, unchanged. Intensive ground training followed by incremental flying training using both dual-control and solo flight methods remain the core of today's training programs much as they were in 1917. Although it is tempting to declare the Army Air Service's pilot training program in World War another triumph for American ingenuity and know-how, nothing could be further from the truth. While the story of the making of America's first eagles is truly phenomenal, it is anything but uniquely American.
In April, 1917, America faced the task of fighting a war that she was by no means prepared to fight. Not only was America faced with the daunting challenges of mobilizing an army ill-prepared to fight a major conflict but, she also had to create an air force from virtual non-existence. There was no industrial base from which to build the aircraft for an air force and no training program to develop the aviators to the fly the aircraft once they were built. Lt Col Hiram Bingham, one of the early developers of the American aviation training program summarized the state of affairs in April, 1917:
We lacked men of experience; we lacked able executive officers with a sympathetic knowledge of aviation; we lacked airplanes fit to fly against the Huns; and we lacked the facilities for building them....In other words, America expected to win the war in the air and was utterly unprepared to do so.
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While the Allies My expected American industrial might to contribute significantly to aircraft production, the more immediate problem was the supply of trained aviators.
With virtually no training program in existence and relatively little time to develop one, the decision was made early on to implement training programs which mirrored the tested and well-proven programs of the Allies. Canada, as our closest ally, provided the solution for our stateside training program. The Canadian system was based on the RFC training program and was adopted by the U.S. in total. This system used dual-control training intermingled with solo flights and provided the most rapid means of accomplishing preliminary and advanced training prior to sending American pilots to France for combat duties.
Training at the preliminary schools in U.S. began almost immediately but it soon became apparent that the advanced schools would not be able to produce pilots front-line duty quickly enough. In an effort to speed up the process of producing combat-ready pilots, the decision was made to open an American school (Issodun) in France.
Establishing the school at Issodun not only sped-up the process of producing pilots, it also improved the quality of training for those pilots. Instead of waiting for advanced training in the U.S., American pilots would receive training from combat veterans, in aircraft similar to those being flown at the front. 
